Scientists Find US Labs and American Expertise Source
of Mailed Anthrax
A Compilation of Evidence and Comments on the Source of
the Mailed Anthrax
By Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Federation of American Scientists
http://educate-yourself.org/cn/2001/govtsourceofanthrax12dec01.shtml.
revised December 10, 2001
All the available evidence indicates that the source of
the mailed anthrax, or the information and materials to make it, is a US
government program.
1.ANTHRAX STRAIN
All letter samples
contain the same strain of anthrax, corresponding to the AMES strain in
the N. Arizona State University database (which has been used for identification).
The Ames substrain possessed by N. Arizona State is referred to herein
as the "reference strain." That strain was obtained from Porton Down (UK)
in the mid-90's (the sample was marked "October 1932"); Porton had gotten
it from Fort Detrick.
A 2000 paper
by M. Hugh-Jones, PJ Jackson, P. Keim et al says that the Ames strain played
a central role in the US BW program [i.e., before 1969]. Hugh-Jones says
he learned that from David Huxsoll, Former Commander, USAMRIID. However,
he says Vollum 1B was the strain stockpiled (at least in the early days
of the US biological weapons program). The search for better strains undoubtedly
continued, leading the US program to prefer the Ames strain because of
its high virulence.
The Ames strain
is used now in the US biodefense program for testing vaccines etc. The
Ames reference strain in the N. Arizona collection is probably the earliest
Ames substrain (isolated in 1925 and sealed in 1928, perhaps subcultured
in 1932). There are at least four Ames substrains, all under the control
of Fort Detrick. They were isolated by laboratories in Ames, Iowa but were
not subsequently studied or distributed by them. Undoubtedly the confusion
about Ames substrains could be cleared up by USAMRIID, but they have been
evasive.
2.WEAPONIZATION
"Weaponization"
is used here to mean preparation of the form of anthrax found in the Daschle
letter: fine particles, very narrow size range, treated to eliminate static
charge so it won't clump and will float in the air. The weaponization
process used was extraordinarily effective. The particles have a narrow
size range (1.5-3 microns diameter), typical of the US process.
The extraordinary
concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the letter anthrax
is believed to be characteristic of material made by the US process. A
reporter who writes on anthrax vaccine has privately stated that four labs
have told him that under the electron microscope the appearance of the
sample is like that of unmilled anthrax spores. Milled samples are identifiable
because they contain debris. The optimal US process did not use milling.
The US weaponization
process is secret-Bill Patrick, its inventor, says it involves a COMBINATION
of chemicals. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (Washington
DC) is studying the anthrax using an energy dispersive X-ray spectroscope,
which can detect the presence of extremely tiny quantities of chemicals;
traces of several chemicals have been found. The Senate sample contains
a special form of silica used in the US process. It does not contain bentonite
(used by the Iraqis).
All the letters
probably contained the same material. The clumping of the anthrax in the
two letters mailed on Sept 18 (to NBC and the NY Post) probably resulted
from the letters getting wet in the course of mail processing or delivery,
according to Army scientists. This conclusion is strengthened by the similarity
of the Florida anthrax (the first to be observed, probably also mailed
on Sept 18) to that in the Daschle letter, mailed Oct 9.
3.ANTHRAX PRODUCTION
A study of genetic
drift at certain locations in anthrax is underway at Northern Arizona State
University. The results are expected to give an idea of how many times
the letter anthrax had replicated, in comparison to the reference strain-ie,
whether it was grown on a very large scale (as in a State program) or on
a very small scale, as would be likely if recently made by a terrorist.
Analysis of trace contaminants could also indicate the scale/method of
production (ie, liquid medium, in a fermenter, or solid medium, on petri
dishes, a likely method for small-scale preparation).
4.OTHER ANALYSES
It has just been
reported that the complete sequence has been determined for the genomes
of both the anthrax used in the Florida attack and the Ames reference strain
to which it corresponds. This work was done under government contract by
the Institute for Genomic Research, a private non-profit organization.
The results have not been made public but they are in government hands
and there has been no retraction of the oft-repeated official statement
that the letter anthrax matches the Ames reference strain.
In addition,
sequence data will reveal whether the Ames reference strain is a mixture
of types, as sequencing has revealed to be the case for another anthrax
strain. If so, the proportions of the mixture may differ from lab to lab
and could be used to identify the source. Senator Bob Graham, Chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in late October that investigators
can identify with great certainty which lab produced the anthrax, but it
will be a laborious, time-consuming process. (Chicago Tribune, 27 Oct 01).
5.SOURCE LOCATION
Contrary to early
speculation, there are no more than about 20 laboratories known to have
obtained the Ames strain from Fort Detrick. The names of 15 of these laboratories
have been found in the open literature (see Appendix). Of these, probably
only about four in the US might possibly have the capability for weaponizing
anthrax. These include both US military laboratories and government contractors.
6.INFORMATION REGARDING THE PERPETRATOR
Analysts believe
the letters were not written by a Middle-Easterner. The FBI publicly conjectures
that the
perpetrator was a lone, male domestic terrorist, obviously one with
a scientific background and lab experience who could handle hazardous materials.
The perpetrator
must have received anthrax vaccine recently (it requires a yearly booster
shot), whether or not he made the material himself, because filling the
letters was a dangerous operation. The vaccine is in short supply and is
not generally accessible. Vaccination records must be available. The perpetrator
appears to be a forensic expert. In preparing and mailing the letters he
successfully covered every personal trace.
7.TIMING
There was only
one week between Sept 11 and Sept 18, when the first two letters (and probably
another letter, never found, to AMI) were postmarked. This suggests that
the anthrax was already in hand before Sept 11. Did the perpetrator have
advance knowledge of the Sept 11 attacks? Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
has said that he does not believe al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax
attack, and other public officials have
increasingly indicated that the perpetrator was probably domestic.
8.PUBLIC STATEMENTS
At first, US
officials provided miscellaneous bits of information, some conflicting;
then denied some of the earlier information, then clammed up. They now
have a great deal of information that has not been made public. Under pressure
from leaks, they have started a gradual release of information again. The
US rejected a UN resolution offered by France to condemn the anthrax attack,
on the grounds that it could have been domestic terrorism.
The Secretary
of Health and Human Services said in October that some of the relevant
information is classified, and some is restricted by the FBI. John Bolton,
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, spoke
on Nov. 19 at the opening of the five-yearly Review Conference of the Biological
Weapons Convention in Geneva. At a press conference following his talk,
he said "We don't know, as I say in the statement, at the moment, in a
way that we could make public, where the anthrax attacks came from." This
statement, as well as other information, indicates that US officials DO
know where the anthrax came from.
The FBI says
it is now investigating government and contractor laboratories possessing
the Ames strain, and individuals who had access to them. Col. Arthur Friedlander,
Sr. Research Scientist at USAMRIID, said no one there knows how to make
dry weaponsized anthrax.
According to
the New York Times (2 Dec 01), a law enforcement official close to the
federal investigation called the concept of a government insider, or someone
in contact with an insider, "the most likely hypothesis…it's definitely
reasonable." An American official sympathetic to this thesis was quoted
in the same article saying that, in addition to military laboratories,
"there are other government and contractor facilities that do classified
work with access to dangerous strains, but it's highly likely that
the material in the anthrax letters came from a person or persons
who really had great expertise. We haven't seen any other artifacts that
point us elsewhere."
Senate Majority
Leader Thomas Daschle, recipient of one of the anthrax letters, has been
in frequent contact with investigators. He said on Dec 8 that the perpetrator
was probably someone with a military background.
9.MOST LIKELY HYPOTHESIS
The perpetrator
is probably an American microbiologist who has access to weaponized anthrax
or to the expertise and materials for making it, in a US government
or contractor lab. He does not live in or near Trenton, but more probably
in the Washington, DC area. Trenton is probably accessible to him (it is
a stop on the Amtrak line that runs along the East coast), but if
he is smart enough to handle anthrax he is smart enough not to mail it
from his home town.
The anthrax in
the letters was probably made and weaponized in a US government or contractor
lab. It might have been made recently by the perpetrator on his own, or
made as part of the US biodefense program; or it may be a remnant of the
US biological weapons program before Nixon terminated the program in 1969.
Weaponization of dry anthrax after 1972, when the Biological Weapons Convention
was signed, could be construed as a violation of the Convention.
The motive of
the perpetrator was not necessarily to kill but to create public fear,
thereby raising the profile of BW. He simply took advantage of Sept 11
to throw suspicion elsewhere. The letters warned of anthrax or the need
to take antibiotics, making it possible for those who handled the letters
to protect themselves; and it seems unlikely that the perpetrator
would have anticipated that the rough treatment of mail in letter sorters
etc, would force anthrax spores through the pores of the envelopes (which
were taped to keep the anthrax inside) and infect postal workers
and others. The choice of media as targets seems to have been cleverly
designed to ensure publicity about the threat of biological weapons. One
can only speculate that the perpetrator may have wished to push the US
government toward retaliatory action against some enemy, or to attract
funding or recognition to some program with which he is associated. The
choice of Senators Daschle and Leahy as targets may be a clue that has
yet to be deciphered.
The US government
has undoubtedly known for some time that the anthrax terrorism was an inside
job. They may be reluctant to admit this. They also may not yet have adequate
hard evidence to convict the perpetrator. In opposition to most of
the countries of the world, the Bush administration turned down a Protocol
to monitor compliance with the ban on biological weapons last July. In
so doing it reversed the policy of the
previous three administrations aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons
Convention, which lacks verification measures. The action put the US at
odds with most of its allies and fueled accusations of US unilateralism,
according to the Washington Times (Dec 5). The anthrax attacks have
had no effect on administration policy. At the start of a five-yearly Biological
Weapons Convention Review Conference last month, Under-Secretary Bolton
caused dissention by accusing several parties to the Convention of violating
it. On Dec 7, the last day of the conference, the US doublecrossed its
European allies by reversing a compromise agreement of the previous day,
thereby causing an uproar and derailing the Conference. According to European
diplomats, failure of the conference sends the message that the international
community is not willing to enforce the ban on biological
weapons.
Conclusions:
A recent report by the Congressional GAO, as well as many recent statements
by military and
non-governmental experts in the BW field, holds that terrorists are
unlikely to be able to mount a major biological attack without substantial
assistance from a government sponsor. The recent anthrax attack was a minor
one but nonetheless we now see that it was perpetrated with the unwitting
assistance of a sophisticated government
program. It is reassuring to know that it was not perpetrated by a lone
terrorist without state support. It is not reassuring, however, to discover
that a secret US program may have been the source of that support, and
that security is so dangerously lax in military or defense contractor laboratories.
US government insistence on pursuing and maintaining the secrecy of elaborate
biological threat assessment activities is undermining the prohibitions
of the Biological Weapons Convention and encouraging biological weapons
proliferation in other countries, which in turn may support bioterrorist
attacks on the American public.
APPENDIX
LABORATORIES THAT HAVE WORKED WITH THE AMES STRAIN OF ANTHRAX
(Information obtained from open sources)
1.USArmy Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
(Ft. Detrick, MD)#*
2.Dugway Proving Ground (Utah)#*
3.Naval Research Medical Center and associated military
labs (MD)#
4.Battelle Memorial Institute (Ohio; plus laboratories
in many other locations)#*
5.Duke University Medical School, Clinical Microbiology
Lab. (NC)
6.VA Medical Center, Durham (NC)
7.USDA laboratory and Iowa State College of Veterinary
Medicine, Ames (Iowa)
8.LSU College of Veterinary Medicine*
9.Northern Arizona State University (Arizona)*
10.Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IL)
11.University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center, Albuquerque
(NM)*
12.Institute for Genomic Research (MD)
13.Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down
(UK)*
14.Center for Applied Microbiology and Research, Porton (UK)*
15.Defense Research Establishment, Suffield (CA)*
In addition, CDC, NIH, and Los Alamos and a few others may have the
Ames strain.
* Obtained through a FOIA request by the Washington Post (article Nov
30, 01)
# indicates laboratories in the US that are probably more likely than
the others to have weaponization capabilities.
Web posted at: http://fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxpaper.htm
via courtesy of J. Orlin Grabbe (http://orlingrabbe.com/homepage.html)
All information posted on this web site is
the opinion of the author and is provided for educational purposes only.
It is not to be construed as medical advice. Only a licensed medical doctor
can legally offer medical advice in the United States. Consult the healer
of your choice for medical care and advice.